N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals that reversed and remanded an order of the Circuit Court for Racine County, Judge Wilbur W. Warren III.

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. This case is before the court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2005-06). Keith A. Davis was charged with first-degree sexual assault of a child in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (2003-04). Davis sought to suppress all oral and written statements he provided to the Green Bay Police Department on December 17, 2003. The Brown County circuit court judge, Donald R. Zuidmulder, denied Davis's motion to suppress. Davis proceeded to trial and was convicted of first-degree sexual assault of a child. He now requests that his judgment of conviction be vacated and his case be remanded to the circuit court for a new trial, which would exclude his inculpatory statement. We decline that request and affirm Davis's conviction.

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. This case is before the court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2005-06). The State alleges that Bruce MacArthur sexually abused three children between 1965 and 1972. Accordingly, he was charged with multiple counts of having sexual intercourse with a child and indecent behavior with a child pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 944.10(1), 944.10(3), 944.11(1), and 944.11(2) (1966-67). He moved to dismiss those charges based upon the statute of limitations. The circuit court denied MacArthur's motion to dismiss.

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals.

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J. The defendant, WMA Securities, Inc., seeks review of an unpublished court of appeals decision affirming in part and reversing in part a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court for Rock County, James Welker, Judge. After the defendant continuously failed to comply with the circuit court's discovery orders, the circuit court issued an order striking the defendant's pleadings and awarding judgment by default to the plaintiff, Ramachandra Rao, M.D., against the defendant.

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. This is a review of a published court of appeals' decision, which affirmed the decision of the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, John A. Franke, Judge, to dismiss C. Coakley Relocation Systems, Inc.'s (Coakley) amended complaint that sought comparable replacement property and relocation assistance and benefits.

PER CURIAM. Dwight D. Jones appeals pro se from the circuit court's denial of his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2005-06) postconviction motion. We agree with the circuit court that Jones's claims were procedurally barred by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 181-82, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994) (postconviction claims that could have been raised in prior postconviction or appellate proceedings are barred absent a sufficient reason for failing to raise the claims in the earlier proceeding), and State v. Tillman, 2005 WI App 71, ¶¶19-20, 281 Wis. 2d 157, 696 N.W.2d 574 (the Escalona-Naranjo procedural bar applies to defendants whose direct appeal was via the no-merit procedure, as long as the no-merit procedures were in fact followed, and the record demonstrates a sufficient degree of confidence in the result). We also conclude that Jones's claims are meritless. We therefore affirm the circuit court's order.

PER CURIAM. Louis Delphie appeals from a judgment convicting him of seven counts of hostage taking and one count each of kidnapping, burglary while armed, armed robbery, and child abuse--intentionally causing harm. He asserts the trial court should have granted his request for a new attorney and his motion for a mistrial, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilt. We disagree and affirm.

KESSLER, J. Bernardo Hernandez appeals from a judgment of conviction and orders denying his postconviction motion. We conclude that he raises three issues: (1) denial of his due process rights because the trial court failed to obtain a personal waiver from Hernandez of his right to be present after the trial began at the in-chambers questioning of jurors; (2) denial of his due process rights because the trial court ordered him shackled during trial; and (3) the trial court's denial of his motions for mistrial based on several claims of jury bias. We affirm.

PETERSON, J. Frank Cottone appeals a judgment of conviction for misdemeanor battery and an order denying his motion for a new trial. Cottone argues the trial court erred by finding the State's failure to disclose a tape recorded conversation of a witness's statement to police was not prejudicial. He also argues the trial court erred by submitting simple battery as a lesser included offense of aggravated battery. We agree that the State's failure to disclose evidence was prejudicial and therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. We do not reach the second argument.

PER CURIAM. Albert B. Collins appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court found him guilty of one count of attempted abduction of a child by force, contrary to WIS. STAT. §§ 948.30(2)(b) and 939.32 (2005-06). Collins contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction as the victim's testimony was discredited by the inconsistencies. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the judgment of conviction, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Michael P. Corrao appeals from the judgment of conviction entered against him and the order denying his motion for postconviction relief. Corrao argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel did not argue that his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), were violated, and that the trial court erred when it allowed the use of derivative evidence. Because we conclude that he did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the trial court did not err, we affirm the judgment and order.

PER CURIAM. Robert Moralle Madden appeals, pro se, from an order denying his WIS. STAT. § 974.06 (2005-06)(1) motion seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Madden claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to explain the consequences of "read-ins," for failing to object to the State's alleged violation of the plea agreement, and for failing to raise an issue related to an inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report. Madden argues that his postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to raise these claims regarding his trial counsel's failures. Because Madden's ineffective assistance claims are procedurally barred by State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), and because Madden waived his right to review on the claimed inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report, we affirm.

DYKMAN, J. Julian Bethel appeals from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. He contends that he is entitled to withdraw his plea of no contest to battery and disorderly conduct because he was denied effective assistance of counsel and because his plea was involuntary. Bethel claims his counsel was ineffective because he (1) failed to advise Bethel of all the consequences of his plea, including the possible use of the conviction to enhance his sentence in a future criminal case, and (2) failed to explain to Bethel that he was being charged under the habitual criminal statute, which Bethel argues was erroneously applied to him. Bethel argues he would not have entered a plea if his counsel had provided that information to him, and thus his plea was involuntary. We conclude that Bethel's arguments are without merit, and therefore affirm.

PER CURIAM. John A. Kinard has appealed from a judgment convicting him upon a guilty plea of third-degree sexual assault in violation of WIS. STAT. § 940.225(3) (2005-06). In exchange for Kinard's guilty plea, a charge of second-degree sexual assault in violation of WIS. STAT. § 940.225(2)(b) was dismissed and read-in for purposes of sentencing.

PER CURIAM. Khion Murjani Martin has appealed pro se from a judgment convicting him of first-degree reckless injury by use of a dangerous weapon, party to the crime, in violation of WIS. STAT. §939.05, § 939.63(1)(b) and § 940.23(1)(a) (2005-06). He also appeals from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief. We affirm the judgment and order.

LUNDSTEN, J. At issue here is whether a trial judge is prohibited from informing a defendant that the judge intends to exceed a sentencing recommendation in a plea agreement and offering the opportunity of plea withdrawal. In State v. Williams, 2000 WI 78, 236 Wis. 2d 293, 613 N.W.2d 132, the supreme court declined to adopt a new rule mandating that judges follow this practice. Here, the State argues that the reasoning employed in Williams dictates that a judge may not tell a defendant that the judge intends to exceed a sentencing recommendation. We disagree, and conclude that trial judges may employ this practice. Accordingly, we affirm.

VERGERONT, J.(1) Dennis Bravick appeals the circuit court's order revoking the deferred prosecution agreement and the resulting adjudication of guilt and sentence for misdemeanor bail jumping contrary to WIS. STAT. § 946.49(1)(a). We conclude the circuit court did not err in revoking the deferred prosecution agreement and we therefore affirm.

PER CURIAM. Jason E. Kurtz appeals from a corrected judgment of conviction for first-degree reckless homicide and for delivering a controlled substance, and from a postconviction order denying his motion for a new trial or a retrospective hearing. The issues are whether the trial court improperly denied Kurtz's motion for severance, and for a change of trial counsel. We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Kurtz's severance motion; however, the trial court did not conduct an adequate inquiry into Kurtz's motion for a change of trial counsel. Therefore, we affirm the judgment and that part of the postconviction order confirming the trial court's previous denial of severance, but reverse that part of the order denying a change of counsel, and remand the cause with directions for a retrospective evidentiary hearing.

PER CURIAM. Fil-mor Express, Inc., George Bruce, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company appeal a judgment awarding damages to Steve and Carla Balcsik, d/b/a Balcsik Farms, Inc. Liberty challenges the jury's determination of damages, arguing the damages exceed what is permissible by law. Liberty also contends the court erroneously admitted hearsay evidence. We reject Liberty's arguments and affirm the judgment.

DYKMAN, J. The Estate of Joanna Brown appeals from an order granting summary judgment to Mathy Construction Company, a contractor for the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT). Joanna and her daughter Dallas died when their car struck an exposed bridge abutment on a segment of a state highway that was under construction. The trial court held that under Estate of Lyons v. CNA Insurance Co., 207 Wis. 2d 446, 558 N.W.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1996), Mathy is entitled to governmental immunity from liability in the deaths of Joanna and Dallas. We conclude that the undisputed facts demonstrate that Mathy, as a state contractor, is entitled to Lyons governmental immunity. Accordingly, we affirm.

PER CURIAM. Dumke & Associates, LLC, a creditor against the estate of Dr. Albert Gadowski, appeals an order granting a petition to transfer real property from Gadowski's estate to Frances Wheeler. The court transferred the property after determining that Wheeler was a secured creditor and that there was no equity in the property. Dumke claims Wheeler was an unsecured creditor who failed to file a timely claim against the estate. We disagree and affirm the order.

PER CURIAM. Mark Johnson appeals an order vacating a divorce judgment granted to Cora and Scott Johnson. Mark argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the judgment. Alternatively, Mark argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Cora was not a resident of Waupaca County for the thirty days preceding commencement of the divorce action. Mark also contends that judicial and equitable estoppel should have barred the circuit court from vacating the judgment. Finally, Mark argues that the circuit court's decision should be overturned on public policy grounds. We reject Mark's arguments and affirm the order.

VERGERONT, J. This is an original action for a supervisory writ in which the parent of a child who is the subject of a CHIPS petition seeks an order directing the circuit court, the Honorable Shelley Gaylord, to enter an order dismissing the CHIPS action pursuant to a stipulation between the parties. The parent contends that, because all parties stipulated to dismissal under WIS. STAT. § 805.04(1), the voluntary dismissal statute, the circuit court has no authority to reject a dismissal. The circuit court responds that § 805.04(1) does not apply in a CHIPS proceeding under WIS. STAT. ch. 48.

PETERSON, J. Lawrence J.B. appeals an order terminating his parental rights. He argues he was denied the right to meaningfully participate in the fact-finding hearing. We agree and reverse and remand for a new trial.

PER CURIAM. Gary Schumacher appeals a summary judgment concluding McMillan Warner Mutual Insurance Company has no duty to defend or indemnify him in this action. We conclude the allegations in the complaint fit squarely within McMillan's policy exclusion for losses resulting from "the sale of milk or milk-derived products which do not meet the expectations of the purchaser or consumer." We therefore affirm the judgment holding that McMillan has no duty to defend. However, the court prematurely decided McMillan has no duty to indemnify Schumacher. We reverse that portion of the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

FINE, J. Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Company, appeals the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Harco National Insurance Company dismissing Acuity's third-party complaint against Harco. Harco is K & B Transportation, Inc.'s insurer; Acuity insures Hansen Storage Company. Acuity contends that Harco provided primary coverage in connection with an accident on the premises of Acuity's insured, Hansen Storage, and caused by a Hansen employee. We affirm.

VERGERONT, J. Tenneco, Inc., appeals an order granting summary judgment in favor of Gulf Underwriters Insurance Company on Tenneco's cross-claim against Gulf based on the insurance contract between Gulf and McClain Group, Inc. Tenneco also appeals the court's grant of summary judgment in favor of McClain on Tenneco's cross-claim against McClain. Based on the undisputed facts, we conclude McClain is entitled to summary judgment because of the one-year time limit for bringing claims against it under Michigan's corporate dissolution statute. We also conclude Gulf is entitled to summary judgment because Tenneco is not a third-party beneficiary to the insurance contract between Gulf and McClain. Thus, although our analysis differs from that of the circuit court, we conclude that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of both Gulf and McClain.

SNYDER, J. Shelly L. Mason appeals from a judgment of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence (OWI), third offense, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a) (2003-04). Mason contends that the circuit court erred when it denied her motion to suppress evidence of the violation, alleging that the officer illegally entered her residence. Specifically, she argues that the officer's entry into her home was not justified under the community caretaker doctrine and, therefore, her Fourth Amendment rights were violated. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

LUNDSTEN, J. David Feldman appeals the circuit court's judgment convicting him of operating a vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (third offense), operating while revoked (second offense), and misdemeanor bail jumping. Feldman challenges the circuit court's order denying his motion to suppress the results of a preliminary breath test (PBT) and a blood draw. We affirm the judgment.

DYKMAN, J. Chad Goretski appeals from judgments convicting him of Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of an Intoxicant (Third Offense) in violation of WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a) and Misdemeanor Bail Jumping in violation of WIS. STAT. § 946.49(1)(a). Goretski argues that police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him based on a tipster's call. We conclude that the totality of the circumstances did not provide police with reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop and therefore reverse.

PER CURIAM. Robert Gabert appeals a judgment of foreclosure, asserting Rollan and Deborah Fuller do not have a valid mortgage upon which they can foreclose. We agree and, accordingly, reverse the judgment.

PER CURIAM. The City of Hillsboro appeals from an order dismissing its claim for unpaid taxes against Cletus Hardy. The issues relate to piercing the corporate veil and a statutory claim. We affirm.

VERGERONT, J. This is a wrongful death action in which the plaintiffs claim that Barry Fox, Director of Facilities for Camp Randall Stadium, negligently caused the death of Richard Umansky, who fell from a platform in the stadium while working as a cameraman for ABC Inc. The plaintiffs appeal the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Fox after the court concluded he is immune from liability under the common law doctrine of immunity for state employees. The plaintiffs contend Fox is not immune because (1) he had a ministerial duty under 29 C.F.R. § 1910.23(c)(1), incorporated by WIS. ADMIN. CODE §§ Comm 32.15 (Mar. 1999) and 32.50 (July 2002), to have a rail on the platform from which Umansky fell; (2) the known danger exception to immunity applies; and (3) broad immunity for discretionary acts is inconsistent with earlier Wisconsin case law.

NEUBAUER, J. Hartford Citizens for Responsible Government ("HCRG") appeals from the circuit court order denying its request to set aside a previous order dismissing as untimely its request for certiorari review. The circuit court found that HCRG arrived at the Washington county clerk of circuit court office just after closing to file a last minute appeal from a decision of the City of Hartford Board of Zoning Appeals. The clerk of court accepted the papers but did not file them until the following day. As a result, the papers were filed outside of the thirty-day statutory time limit set forth in WIS. STAT. § 62.23(7)(e)(10) (2005-06).